How to Share a Password Safely (Without Slack Keeping It Forever)

The password you pasted into a chat in 2022 is still there, in a backup, in a search index, in an export. Here is the two-channel method that leaves nothing useful behind.

Where a pasted password ends up

Chat and email feel ephemeral and are the opposite. A message is stored on the provider's servers, replicated to backups, indexed for search, included in compliance exports, and synced to every device the recipient has ever signed in on. Deleting it from your view deletes it from your view. The credential you shared in a hurry three years ago is, for practical purposes, permanent.

The ordinary consequences are mundane: a departed contractor's laptop still has the chat history, an export for a legal request contains the admin login, a search for the word password in the workspace returns a list. The fix is not to find a more private channel. There is no private channel. The fix is to make the thing you send useless to anyone but the recipient.

The two-channel method

Encrypt the secret with a passphrase. Send the encrypted text by one route and the passphrase by another. Chat for the ciphertext, a phone call for the passphrase; email for one, a text message for the other. Anyone who later reads either channel has half of a thing that needs both halves.

The text encryptor produces the ciphertext as a single string that pastes anywhere, with the salt and nonce packed inside so the recipient needs nothing but the passphrase. It uses AES-256-GCM with a key derived by PBKDF2 at 600,000 iterations, through the browser's built in SubtleCrypto, and nothing is sent to a server because there is no server. The recipient pastes the string and the passphrase into the same page and reads the secret.

The passphrase should be a sentence, not a word. Length is what makes guessing slow, and the derivation step is tuned so that each guess costs an attacker the better part of a second. A passphrase you can say over the phone is exactly the right kind.

What not to do with the passphrase

Do not send it in the same thread as the ciphertext. A locked box with the key taped to the lid is not locked. Do not reuse a passphrase you use for anything else; the password breach checker will tell you if a candidate is already on a leaked list. Do not write it in the encrypted message itself, which happens more often than it should.

Once the recipient has decrypted and stored the secret properly, the passphrase can be forgotten. It protected one message, once, and its job is done.

Better still: do not share the password

Most password sharing is a workaround for a missing account. A contractor needs the admin login because nobody made them their own. The right fix is a separate account with its own password, which can be revoked when they leave without changing the one everyone else uses.

Where a shared credential is unavoidable, an API key, a service account, a Wi-Fi password, a password manager with a shared vault is the tool built for the job: the secret is stored encrypted, access is granted and removed per person, and nobody ever sees it in a chat. The two-channel method is for the cases that fall outside that, and for the moment before the vault exists.

The password itself

Whatever is being shared should have been generated, not invented. A sixteen-character random string from the password generator has never been in a breach and cannot be guessed in any useful time; an invented one is drawn from the same patterns everyone uses. Generate, encrypt, send by two channels, store in a manager at the far end, and the chat log holds a string that means nothing.

For checking that a file arrived intact rather than secret, the hash generator is the right tool, and the distinction matters: a hash proves nothing was changed, encryption keeps it from being read, and neither one does the other's job.

Questions people ask

Is it safe to send a password over Slack or email?

Not in plain text. Messages are stored, backed up, indexed and exported, and deletion only removes your view. Encrypt the password with a passphrase, send the ciphertext in the chat and the passphrase by a different route, and the stored message is useless on its own.

What is the two-channel method?

Send the encrypted secret one way and the passphrase another: chat and phone, email and text. Anyone who later reads one channel has half of something that needs both halves. The encryption tool runs in the browser so the plain secret never touches a server at any point.

What should the passphrase be?

A sentence you can say aloud, unique to this one message. Length is what makes it strong, and the key derivation is deliberately slow so that each guess costs an attacker real time. Never reuse a passphrase from anywhere else, and never put it in the same thread as the ciphertext.

Why not just use a password manager's share feature?

You should, where one exists. A shared vault is the right long-term answer: the secret stays encrypted, access is per person and revocable, and nothing appears in a chat. The two-channel method covers the cases outside a vault and the moment before one is set up.

Can the encrypted text be decrypted without the website?

Yes. The format is one version byte, a 16-byte salt, a 12-byte nonce and AES-256-GCM ciphertext, Base64 encoded, with the key from PBKDF2-SHA256 at 600,000 iterations. Anyone with that description and a standard crypto library can decrypt it; the page is a convenience, not a dependency.

What happens if the recipient loses the passphrase?

The ciphertext cannot be recovered without it, and there is no reset because there is no account. Encrypt the secret again with a new passphrase and send both halves afresh. The old ciphertext remains useless to anyone who finds it, which is the point of the method.

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